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“V.I.P” VIDEOGRAPHER INTIMIDATION PROTECTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT
SHOULD PROTECT CITIZENS WHO VIDEOTAPE THE POLICE
David Murphy*
I. Introduction
With each passing day, more incidents involving police officers, private citizens, and
video cameras are emerging on the internet, making the news, and sometimes appearing on civil
and criminal dockets.1 When these individuals bring these incidents to public attention, more
people actively seek to record police, which creates more opportunities for police officers to
intimidate videographers.2 On YouTube, an internet user can watch hours of uploaded footage
showing police officers aggressively confronting videographers.3 These encounters between
police officers and videographers raise questions about police conduct and the rights of private
citizens to film police. Several courts, police departments, and legal scholars have addressed
these questions, but have failed to reach a consensus as to whether police will stop intimidating
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1
See, e.g., Hinhin2, Good Cops, Doing Their Job, Professionally, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sylrpLhG4w0&NR=1; DanceRooster, How To Invoke Your Rights With the
Police, YOUTUBE (Jan. 23, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0En_sdsyh1M&feature=related;
RidleyReport, NH: What to Do When Cops Order Camera Shutoff?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 13, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLSptMe3yw0&feature=related; Acumensch, Film Is Not A Crime, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMDW4Fszj2U.
2
See sources cited supra note 1. The titles of these videos and related posts on the internet indicate that at least
some private citizens are actively filling the role of providing public oversight to police conduct. As “how to” and
other oversight videos continue to be uploaded and earn views, the amount of videos being produced is likely to
increase, thus increasing the likelihood for confrontations with police over the use of the video camera.
3
See, e.g., Ccpafl, Cop Watcher Arrested While Filming Police, YOUTUBE (May 9, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_8Bv0wNgCY&feature=related; RTAmerica, Woman Arrested for Filming
Police, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OtJpL2ZdWVI; HellandKeller, Police vs.
Civilians
w/
Video
Camera,
YOUTUBE
(Aug.
31,
2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_U1oFcCAZo&feature=related.
By using keywords like “police,”
“intimidation,” and “camera” in the search query, users can endlessly watch videos of confrontations between
private citizens and police officers regarding the use of video cameras.
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videographers.4 Thus, the power to protect individuals and their rights to film police officers lies
in the hands of legislatures.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently addressed some of these questions
when it decided Glik v. Cunniffe.5 Boston police officers arrested Simon Glik for using his
cellular phone’s digital video camera to film several police officers arresting a young man.6 Glik
was subsequently charged with violation of Massachusetts’ Anti-Wiretapping Statute7 and two
other state-law offenses which the Court deemed baseless and thereby dismissed.8 Ultimately,
the First Circuit held that defendant police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from
Glik’s constitutional claims because Glik had “clearly established First Amendment rights in
filming the officers in public space.”9
Glik demonstrates that the First Circuit is willing to defend a First Amendment right to
videotape police officers. But not all courts extend a public right to film police officers, and the
precise source of the right to film police within the First Amendment is somewhat elusive.10
Arguably, the law is leaning in the direction of “protecting” individuals who film police officers
in public, but police officers may be actively suppressing the use of video cameras to record
police conduct.11 If a First Amendment right to film police officers exists, or at least ought to
exist, then state legislatures must protect videographers from overreaching police intimidation.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss police intimidation of videographers and to
provide a legislative model that protects videographers who film police conduct.

Part II

discusses how filming police in public is protected First Amendment activity. Part III exposes
4

See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
6
Id.
7
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000).
8
Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
9
Id. at 85.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part II.
5
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how the current legal environment incentivizes police officers to intimidate videographers who
attempt to film police conduct. Part IV scrutinizes the current framework of deterrents designed
to prevent police misconduct and discusses why these safeguards fail to protect videographers.
Part V proposes a bright-line rule imposing harsh punishments to effectively deter police officers
from intimidating law-abiding videographers who capture police conduct on camera. Lastly,
Part VI will provide the conclusion of this discussion.
II. Filming Police Officers in Public and First Amendment Protection
This section provides an overview of the ambiguous First Amendment right to film police
in public and discusses how legal and academic consensus is trending towards protection for
videographers. Some courts have already held that the First Amendment protects filming police
officers, but these courts have failed to precisely explain such a right’s origins and limitations.12
Other courts, however, have not recognized a broad right to film police within the First
Amendment.13 Despite this dissonance, a First Amendment right to film police officers in public
will probably solidify in the future based on recent court decisions and legal scholarship arguing
for such a right.14

12

See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs “had a
First-Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police
conduct,” and that the First Amendment “protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on
public property,” but failing to clearly elaborate where in the First Amendment such a powerful right exists); State v.
Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *33–34 (Sept. 27, 2010) (“[S]tatutes which implicate the
free speech protections of the First Amendment must be narrowly construed.”).
13
See, e.g., Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006) (explaining
that the act of photographing, by itself, is not sufficiently communicative and therefore not subject to FirstAmendment protection, regardless of whether or not the subject is a public servant).
14
See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011). See generally Caycee Hampton, Case Comment:
Confirmation of a Catch-22: Glik v. Cunniffe and the Paradox of Citizen Recording, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1549 (2011);
Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (2011); Lisa A. Skehill, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts
Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow For the Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
981 (2009); Howard W. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L.
REV. 600, 665 (2009).

3

In relevant part, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”15
Despite lacking direct reference to the language of the First Amendment, Glik recognized an
“unambiguous” right to gather and disseminate information related to matters of public interest,
especially police conduct.16 Likewise, the Supreme Court has indicated that First Amendment
protection extends beyond the press, and to individuals like Glik, in regard to gathering public
information.17
But precisely how the First Amendment affords such protection is not clearly
established.18 In Glik, First Circuit Judge Lipez remarked that “the First Amendment’s aegis
extends further than the text’s proscription on laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press,’ and encompasses a range of conduct” related to information-gathering and
dissemination.19 To connect these principles to the filming of police officers in public, the court
declared that “[t]he filming of . . . police officers performing their responsibilities” is a “cardinal
First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting” information-gathering, dissemination,
and “free discussion of government affairs.”20 The court easily categorized Glik’s activity as

15

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 (holding that “though not unqualified, a citizen’s right to film government officials, including
law enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and well-established
liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment”).
17
See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11
(1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681–82 (1972).
18
See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82. In opinions such as Fordyce, the court merely glanced over “the First Amendment right
to film matters of public interest” without sufficiently explaining where the right is derived from. Fordyce v. City of
Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
19
Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (extending the First
Amendment’s reach in Glik by attributing that it “goes beyond protection of the press and self-expression of
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw”).
20
Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)); see also Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332,
1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) ) ( “[T]he First Amendment
protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to
16
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information-gathering and dissemination but it failed to clearly support why that activity was
actually protected by the First Amendment.21

Circuit Judge Lipez strongly supported his

position with case law like Smith v. City of Cumming and Fordyce v. City of Seattle.22 However,
upon closer inspection, those Supreme Court opinions merely addressed a videographer’s First
Amendment rights in passing and failed to precisely derive the source of protection from the
language of the First Amendment.23 The majority of the sources used in Glik are somewhat
ambiguous as to how the right to film matters of public concern is actually protected First
Amendment activity.24
However, one source provides more specific insight on how filming police officers is
protected First Amendment activity.

Glik cited Robinson v. Fetterman, which held that

individuals have a free-speech right to film police officers in the course of their public
activities.25 By at least referencing the Speech Clause (“Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech”),26 the court in Robinson modestly provided some legitimate
constitutional support for what Glik would ultimately declare to be a “clearly-established” First
Amendment right to film police officers in public.27
record matters of public interest.”); Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439; Iacobucci v. Boulter, No. CIV.A. 94-10531, 1997 WL
258494 (D.Mass. Mar. 26, 1997)).
21
See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82.
22
Id. at 83 (citing Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 439). Amongst others cited to support the
proposition that “the First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public spaces” are Schnell v.
City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969), and Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465 (D.N.H. 1990).
23
Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333 (where the plaintiffs allege that police harassed them for filming police activity, the court
merely stated that it “agreed” that the plaintiffs had a First-Amendment right and provided no further FirstAmendment analysis). See generally Fordyce, 55 F.3d 436 (this opinion does not discuss the merits of a FirstAmendment right to film but merely rejects the defendants’ motion for summary judgment since a genuine issue of
material fact existed in regard to whether or not the plaintiff’s rights were violated when police seized and smashed
his camera).
24
See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.11; Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035–
36 (1991); Mills, 384 U.S. at 218).
25
Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Videotaping is a legitimate means of
gathering information for public dissemination and can often provide cogent evidence . . . there can be no doubt that
the free speech clause o the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped the [police officers].”).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27
Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
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Branching off from the Speech Clause, some legal scholars have more thoroughly
derived the existence of a First Amendment right to film police officers.28 The right to gather
and disseminate information may be derived from three elements within the First Amendment:
the Speech Clause (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”); the
Press Clause (“or of the press”); and the Petition Clause (“the right of the people . . . to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances”).29

The Speech Clause protects the direct

dissemination of speech, whether the dissemination is the speech itself or conduct that
necessarily facilitates the speech.30

Similarly, the Press Clause is interpreted to protect

reasonable conduct antecedent to expression, such as legitimate means of news-gathering.31
Lastly, the Petition Clause protects information-gathering for private citizens seeking resolution
of legal disputes and for general purposes of self-governance.32
Conceivably, filming police officers could satisfy all three First Amendment clauses that
form the right to gather and disseminate information. Hypothetically, a videographer could
decide to make a documentary about the state of law enforcement in his community by videorecording the local police on duty. The videographer’s commentary about law enforcement
would be the “speech” itself in satisfaction of the Speech Clause and, absent additional conduct

28

Wasserman, supra note 14, at 665.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30
A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 797–99 (9th Cir. 2006).
31
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or
assembly to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First-Amendment
protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”); Barry P.
McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather
Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 354 (2004) (noting that the Speech Clause and Press
Clause may not necessarily even be separate sources of the right to disseminate information, but traditional press
gets extensive First-Amendment protection for its structure news-gathering conduct).
32
See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494 (2011); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 896–
97 (1984); see also McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483 (1985) (“The values in the right of petition as an
important aspect of self-government are beyond question.”).
29
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warranting police intervention, would be facially reasonable.33 The Press Clause would protect
the actual act of filming the police officers in public because it is a necessary and common
means of news-gathering.34 Lastly, since a documentary could make a comment about law
enforcement, the documentary would have a general purpose for self-governance, thus satisfying
the Petition Clause.35 Albeit somewhat simplistic, this model provides how filming police is
protected First Amendment activity directly from the language of the First Amendment itself.
Alternatively, instead of focusing on a right to gather and disseminate information, some
scholars argue that a right to film police officers can be derived from “freedom of expression.”36
For instance, captured images from photography or video-recording can be “like words inscribed
on parchment” and therefore fall within the realm of First Amendment protection.37 The analogy
is that a videographer and his recording are the same as a writer to his writings. Since the
government cannot interfere with a writer chronicling his thoughts and beliefs, likewise it cannot
disrupt a videographer recording in public.38 However, courts have rejected this view, stating
that an image, or video, is not necessarily expression that warrants protection because no idea is
communicated from merely recording.39 Courts, in determining whether an isolated expression

33

Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Taking photographs at a public event is a
facially innocent act.”).
34
See id. Filming or videotaping is an essential part of reporting information and without the right to video-record,
information-gathering could not possibly be effective as it is. Id. (“Videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering
information for public dissemination.”).
35
Debate on public issues should be uninhibited even if they include unpleasant attacks and scrutiny on the
government and public officials. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“For speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. . . . [D]ebate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
36
See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 379.
37
Id.
38
Id. (“The government is barred from intermeddling . . . in both speech and thought . . . [which] undergird the
constitutional commitments to personal autonomy and popular sovereignty.”).
39
Montefusco v. Nassau Cnty., 39 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241–42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that to warrant protection,
“there must still be (1) a message to be communicated and (2) an audience to receive that message regardless of the
medium in which the message is sought to be expressed. . . . [I]f either is lacking, there is absolutely nothing to
transmit from ‘mind to mind’”); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
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was protectable as “symbolic speech,” have weighed the presence or absence of a “message
conveyed” in the act which could constitute expression.40 Compared to the right to gather and
disseminate information, the freedom of expression analysis is somewhat weaker.
Overall, although courts have failed to sufficiently discern a First Amendment right to
film police officers in public, a solid argument exists for such a right. The right to gather and
disseminate information, when derived from the Speech Clause, the Press Clause, and the
Petition Clause, fairly applies to a situation like Glik, where a concerned citizen publicly sought
to document the activity of law enforcement officers with his video camera.41 Thus, the right to
film police officers in public has at least some identifiable roots in the plain language of the First
Amendment.
III. Incentives for Police Officers to Intimidate Videographers
Despite “sweeping” decisions like Glik which strongly protect videographers’ rights,42
police engage in arrests and intimidation tactics to suppress videographers from filming police
conduct in public.43 This Part of the Comment discusses why. Specifically, this Part focuses on
three aspects of the legal environment which compel some police officers to actively confront,
intimidate, and even arrest individuals for filming police conduct in a public space: first, how
police are often threatened by videographers; second, the advantages police wish to maintain in
courtrooms; and lastly, the confusing state of anti-wiretapping statutes and laws of general
applicability which often falsely justify arrests. Because of these three conditions, police officers
568 (1995); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974); Bery v.
City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996).
40
See Montefusco, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 241–42; Kreimer, supra note 14, at 371.
41
See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
42
Erica Goode, New Tool for Police, the Video Camera, and New Legal Issues to Go With It, GOUPSTATE.COM, Oct.
11, 2011, http://www.goupstate.com/article/20111011/ZNYT02/110113009/1088/sports?p=4&tc=pg&tc=ar.
43
ReasonTV,
The
Government’s
War
on
Cameras!,
YOUTUBE
(May
26,
2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=LY0MUARqisM#! (interviewing Professor Eugene
Volokh, who remarks “as it happens, the unfortunate reality is that often officers can intimidate people into not
doing things they otherwise legally could”).
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will continue to suppress video recording of police conduct regardless of how the First
Amendment applies to the issue.
Police are often uncomfortable and threatened by civilians with video cameras. 44 The
basic reality is that some police officers do not appreciate being videotaped, which results in
aggressive reactions from police officers toward videographers.45 Generally, “[p]olice, like
many civilians, are often camera-shy” and “dislike being recorded in embarrassing situations and
may be concerned that dissemination of their images may put them at risk of retaliation.”46
Additionally, police officers often view videography as a challenge to their authority.47
Considering those challenges to authority and the fear of retaliation, the problem for police is
how to respond where every citizen is a potential threat of surveillance and scrutiny.48 Police
face potential bombardment from videographers since recording devices are cheaper and handier
than ever.49 With the proliferation of cheap and handy recording technology, police encounters
in public are more commonly captured on portable media that is disseminated almost instantly,
allowing the public to constantly scrutinize and form opinions of the police.50

44

See, e.g., Police v. Civilians w/ Video Camera, supra note 3 (where the filmed police officer admitted, in
apologizing to the videographers after they had a discussion with his superior, that he “was trying to intimidate” the
videographers).
45
See id.
46
Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357.
47
See Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/12/police_fight_cellphone_recordings/ (quoting
David Ardia, Director of the Citizen Media Law Project at Harvard’s Berman Center for Internet and Society,
“[p]olice are not used to ceding power, and [video cameras] are forcing them to cede power”).
48
Kevin Johnson, For Cops, Citizen Videos Bring Increased Scrutiny, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-10-15-1Avideocops15_CV_N.htm (quoting San Jose Police Chief Rob
Davis, “[t]here is no city not at risk of a video showing an officer doing something wrong . . . [t]he question, when
one of these videos surface, is what we do about it”).
49
Wasserman, supra note 14, at 617–18 (“Technology improvement means that recorded evidence of police-public
encounters, good and bad, will be the norm, more frequently and more widely disseminated, within and without the
news media.”).
50
See Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police, ABC NEWS, July 19, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-arrest/story?id=11179076#.TrW-BXKwXf8;
Keith
B.
Richburg, New York’s Video Vigilante, Scourge of Parking Enforcers, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/02/AR2008080201503.html
(describing
the
increasing trend of amateur videos of police conduct on YouTube).
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Police assert that this trend is a threat to certain societal interests.51 Jim Pasco, the
executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police,52 remarked that the proliferation of cheap
video equipment has “a chilling effect on some officers who are now afraid to act for fear of
retribution by video.”53 Pasco’s statement implies that video causes police officers to secondguess their actions before they act.54 This means that the police officers either act differently or
put less consideration into their actions when they know their conduct is not recorded on camera.
If a police officer knew that his conduct was lawful, justified, and otherwise correct, he would
not hesitate from acting regardless of whether or not a videographer is recording his conduct. A
police officer’s hesitation when he knows his conduct is being recorded reinforces the argument
that the filming of police officers in public causes police officers to lawfully and thoughtfully
conduct police business. Pasco and the police seem to consider recorded observation of police
conduct to be a defect of society’s new power to digitally record in the public, but perhaps it is
actually a positive feature which reduces occurrences of police misconduct.55
As the voice of the world’s largest organization of law enforcement officers, 56 Pasco
established that some police are threatened by the concept that they are under surveillance.57 In
an interview with Reason Magazine’s Radley Balko, Pasco supported the arrests of individuals

51

Johnson, supra note 48 (reporting that some police organizations believe “videotaping officers poses broad risks
that reach beyond internet embarrassments: It could cause officers to hesitate in life-threatening situations”).
52
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, THE VOICE OF OUR NATION’S LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, http://www.fop.net
(last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (“The Fraternal Order of Police is the world’s largest organization of sworn law
enforcement officers, with more than 325,000 members in more than 2,100 lodges. We are the voice of those who
dedicate their lives to protecting and serving our communities. . . . [N]o one knows police officers better than the
FOP.”).
53
Johnson, supra note 48.
54
See id.
55
Radley Balko, Police Officers Don’t Check Their Civil Rights at the Station House Door, REASON (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://reason.com/archives/2010/08/09/police-officers-dont-check-the (referencing how the Washington Post, USA
Today, the Washington Examiner, the Washington Times, and other commentators have “all weighed in on the side
that citizen photography and videography can be an important check to keep police officers accountable and
transparent”).
56
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, supra note 52.
57
See Johnson, supra note 48.
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like Anthony Graber,58 who faced over fifteen years in prison for filming his own traffic stop,
because the video could be manipulated to negatively portray police officers.59 Pasco elaborated
that civilian video could be edited or taken out of context, and when the video is not in the
custody or control of law enforcement, it is rightly inadmissible as evidence.60 Further, Pasco
asserted that “[l]etting people record police officers is an extreme and intrusive response to a
problem that’s so rare it might as well not exist. It would be like saying we should do away with
DNA evidence because there’s a one in a billion chance that it could be wrong [sic].”61 The
“problem” that Pasco is referring to is police misconduct that is uncovered by civilian
videography.62 Overall, if Pasco truly represents the largest law enforcement organization in the
world, then the law-enforcement community views the act of filming a police officer as “extreme
and intrusive.”63 This anxiety explains why police officers may be particularly aggressive
toward videographers.
An important reason why video threatens police officers is that civilian recordings have
revealed serious inconvenient truths and exposed horrible incidents of police misconduct—most
notably, the Rodney King incident.64 Arguably, prohibitions on video recording and image
58

See State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7 (Sept. 27, 2010). Maryland state police
officers raided Anthony Graber’s home, confiscated his camera, computers, and hard drive, and arrested him for
violating state wiretap laws when he posted the video of himself being pulled over by a gun-wielding undercover
police officer on YouTube. Sanchez, supra note 50. Maryland Circuit Court Judge Emory A. Pitt Jr. dismissed the
case reasoning that law enforcement officers enjoy a very narrow expectation of privacy in the performance of their
duties. Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7 at *7–8; see also Peter Hermann, Judge Says Man Within Rights to
Record Police Traffic Stop, BALT. SUN, Sept. 27, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-09-27/news/bs-mdrecorded-traffic-stop-20100927_1_police-officers-plitt-cell-phones; Anthony Graber, Cop Pulls Out Gun On
Motorcyclist, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RK5bMSyJCsg.
59
Balko, supra note 55.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
See id.
63
Id. Pasco is not referring to conduct surrounding recording or police officers, just the act of recording alone. Id.
(Pasco remarks “[y]ou have 960,000 police officers in this country, and millions of contacts between those officers
and citizens. I’ll bet you can’t name 10 incidents [sic] where a citizen video has shown a police officer to have lied
on a police report. . . . Letting people record police officers is an extreme and intrusive.”).
64
See Jim Kavanagh, Rodney King, 20 Years Later, CNN, Mar. 3, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-0303/us/rodney.king.20.years.later_1_laurence-powell-theodore-briseno-king-attorney-milton-grimes?_s=PM:US; see
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capture “are deployed to suppress inconvenient truths.”65

The police’s desire to censor

videographers supports the argument that police officers are interested in controlling public
perception of their conduct, and not just interferences with police business. Since police record
their own conduct at nearly all times they are on duty, justifications for censoring videographers
from recording the exact same conduct seem unreasonable.66 Police previously maintained a
monopoly over the ability to record public confrontations using cameras in cruisers and
recording equipment attached to officers.67

However, the power to record is no longer

unilaterally in police possession since private citizens can cheaply record their lives with
minimal effort.68 Potential First Amendment rights in filming police, broad availability of
recording devices, and cultural obsession with posting personal videos on the internet eliminates
any shroud of secrecy that police could maintain in the public discharge of their duties.69 This
threatening environment encourages police officers to either act appropriately at all times, being
conscious that they are under surveillance, or intimidate videographers to reduce their incentives
to film police conduct.70 Thus, some police officers seek to chill the public from filming their
conduct because that conduct may be illegal, while others like Pasco, find the act of recording

also Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 971–72 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (commenting on
the importance of George Holliday’s infamous recording of the Rodney King incident).
65
Kreimer, supra note 14, at 383.
66
Wasserman, supra note 14, at 651 (stating that “the basic act of recording officers in the performance of their
official duties does not burden the officer or interfere ability”); Goode, supra note 42.
67
INT’L. ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN POLICING 13–26 (2004),
available at http://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/ResourceDetail.aspx?RID=404 (“Attorneys representing [police] agencies
categorically support the use of the in-camera. They pointed out that video evidence allows them to save time in
case disposition. On rare occasions, after reviewing the video evidence, they decided to settle the case in lieu of
proceeding to trial. . . . [T]he presence of the video evidence allow[s] the agency to defend the officer with great
success.”).
68
See Rowinski, supra note 47 (“[T]he proliferation of cellphone and other technology has equipped people to
record actions in public.”).
69
Id.
70
See Balko, supra note 55.
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police to be inherently intrusive.71 It is for these reasons that police officers are incentivized to
confront, intimidate, and arrest videographers.
When the biggest threats to police credibility were merely eye witnesses disseminating
their accounts of an incident, police could at least attempt to plausibly deny embarrassing or
illegal conduct.72 However, once the availability of portable recordable media exploded, police
officers lost the advantages of plausibility, deniability, and controlled documentation of the
incident.73 In “he-said, she-said” factual disputes, police officers are usually given the benefit of
the doubt during proceedings.74 In forming the record, police are accustomed to substantial
deference, and many prefer to be in a position where they can shape the perception of their
actions without competing against a digital record.75 In cases of police misconduct, the facts are
often reduced to a citizen’s word against the police officer’s word.76 Juries are inclined to
believe police officers moreso than ordinary citizens.77 So, prior to the widespread use of
recording devices, police officers maintained a strategic advantage in creating the record.
As portable videography proliferates, police lose their strategic courtroom advantage.
For instance, after Prince George’s County riot police beat Jack McKenna, police officers
provided sworn statements that McKenna “struck [the] officers and their horses, causing minor

71
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75
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76
See, e.g., Youa Vang Lee v. Anderson, Civ. No. 07-1205, 2009 WL 1287832, at *9 (D. Minn. May 6, 2009)
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entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of a policy or custom to be the
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77
See Skehill, supra note 14, at 998; Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 764–65 (1993); Wasserman, supra note 14, at 618.
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injuries.”78 These sworn statements were directly contradicted by amateur video footage of the
incident, which indisputably demonstrated that McKenna never touched the police officers or
their horses but was actually calmly retreating when multiple riot police battered him against a
wall and beat with him batons as he laid on the ground.79 Ultimately, the state dropped all
charges against McKenna and the Prince George’s County Police Chief, Roberto Hylton,
suspended one police officer.80
As the McKenna case illustrated, police officers can lose their credibility very quickly if
outside recordings are brought to the attention of the public and the court. Video evidence is so
effective because the images provide a “direct, unmediated view of the reality they depict,” and
viewers, such as jury members, are more likely to accept those images as “credible
representations” of how events actually transpired.81 Compared to verbal descriptions of events,
images are often more powerful for the viewer because the character of the medium is selfauthenticating.82 When officers are caught “blatantly contradict[ing]” video evidence, the result
is fierce public criticism and sometimes suspension, firing, embarrassment, or civil damages.83
Thus, expanding the availability of video reduces the likelihood that a police officer could
successfully make a false statement.
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Bradley Blackburn, University of Maryland Student Brutally Beaten By Police After Basketball Game, ABC
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Additionally, video evidence is particularly important in the resolution of civil rights
claims that follow allegations of police misconduct. For example, video evidence can drastically
change the outcomes of § 1983 civil rights actions.84 Courts understand video evidence as
“singularly powerful” and “an unambiguous source of proof.”85

Fundamentally, video is

perceived as truthful, objective, and generally unambiguous which often gives the video
evidence dispositive weight in determining the outcome of the civil rights claim.86 Because
videography has this power, police are tempted to preserve their advantage in recording by
preventing outside videographers from ever capturing police conduct in the first place.87 Since a
videographer may capture police misconduct that the officer cannot plausibly deny, police have
to choose between acting appropriately or preventing the creation of evidence of misconduct. As
a result of this dilemma, some police officers have chosen the latter option, and the result is
intimidation, harassment, and sometimes arrests of videographers who film police officers.88
When police arrest videographers, the videographers often demand justification for the
arrest.89 Police officers commonly cite either the local jurisdiction’s anti-wiretapping statute90 or
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general laws such as obstruction of justice or failure to obey a police order. 91 Because of the
confusing state of these laws, especially the anti-wiretapping statutes, citizens are often ignorant
of precisely how the law applies to their videography, which allows police officers to intimidate
videographers.92 Although police may say otherwise, no law directly prohibits a videographer
from filming or photographing things in public.93 Nevertheless, some police still attempt to
combat the spread of public surveillance of police conduct through other existing statutes and
“creative prosecutorial discretion.”94
Police often rely on anti-wiretapping statutes95 to arrest civilians who insist on recording
the police officers without their consent.96 In most states and under federal jurisdictions, the
anti-wiretapping statutes only require one party to consent for legal recording or eavesdropping
of a communication.97 In these “one-party-consent” jurisdictions, if one person consents to the

2002); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540 (West 2003); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
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recording, including the person recording the communication, the conduct is legal.98 Assuming
the videographer is consenting to his own action, police cannot reasonably expect to prosecute or
arrest a videographer in “one-party-consent” jurisdictions for anti-wiretapping reasons.
However, Massachusetts and eleven other jurisdictions (“all-party-consent” jurisdictions)
criminalize recording unless every party in the communication consents to the recording.99
Amongst “all-party-consent” jurisdictions, the issue of whether or not police officers are
protected by anti-wiretapping laws is hotly debated.100 Some jurisdictions require that parties
have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their communication in order to receive protection
from anti-wiretapping statutes.101 A strong argument in these jurisdictions is that police officers
do not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” when conducting police business in public.102
Police officers ought not to expect privacy in public communication because of the public
interest in police oversight, along with the fact that police communications in the line of public
duty are generally less intimate than communications in other contexts.103 In addressing this
issue, some courts have found that police cannot enjoy a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in
the public discharge of their duties, while other courts have found that an expectation of privacy
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is not necessary for a violation of an anti-wiretapping statute to occur.104 In jurisdictions which
require a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” most courts have found that police officers are
public officials, and as such, they are not afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
public discharge of their duties.105
Another element of confusion added to these types of cases is the differentiation between
video and audio recording.106 Many jurisdictions, in not requiring “all-party consent,” may still
require that all parties to the communication be informed or put on notice that the conversation is
being recorded.107 A party may provide notice by showing a video camera in plain sight.108 On
the other hand, for conduct to be covered by an anti-wiretapping statute, it may also need to be
an “oral communication,” which may exclude video from the scope of the anti-wiretapping
statute.109 In Glik, the police officer, assuming Massachusetts’ anti-wiretapping statute only
applied to audio, asked Glik if his cellular phone recorded audio.110 It was only after Glik
answered in the affirmative that police officers arrested him under color of the anti-wiretapping
statute.111 In resolving Glik, the First Circuit failed to differentiate between the audio and video
aspects of Glik’s recording.112

Instead, the court simply declared that Glik had a
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established” right to film police officers in public without indicating precisely which aspect of
Glik’s conduct was protected First Amendment activity.113
Overall, anti-wiretapping statutes are valuable for police officers seeking to suppress
videographers. Since the laws lack clarity and well-defined scope, police can creatively and
effectively cite anti-wiretapping statutes to intimidate even savvy videographers. However, if
police do not assert charges from these anti-wiretapping statutes, they still have laws of general
applicability at their disposal.114
Laws of general applicability are charges like obstruction of justice and may also include
disobeying an officer, obstructing an investigation, interfering with an officer, failure to obey an
officer, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, obstructing a street, and harassment.115 While many
of these charges may be dismissed, people are still arrested, placed into squad cars, and carted
away from the scene in the first place.116 Videographers may be fully within their rights to
videotape the police, but after one confrontation they may expect intimidation, harassment, or
arrest because often “nothing” happens to the police officers who make false arrests.117 Police
are increasingly exercising laws of general applicability to suppress videographers from filming
police conduct because citizens often do not know the laws, which allows police to think they
can get away with applying the charges.118 Overall, the inconvenience and embarrassment of
being arrested creates a chilling effect for videographers that makes laws of general applicability
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another valuable tool for police officers who seek to suppress videographers from filming police
conduct.119
IV. Safeguards to Police Misconduct are Ineffectively Protecting Videographers
When Radley Balka said that “nothing” happens to police officers who unlawfully
intimidate videographers, he did not comprehensively describe how police officers have to
answer for their actions.120 Balka did not mean that literally nothing happens following an
incident between police and videographers, but rather that police do not face serious
consequences for their actions.121 This Part discusses how the present framework of safeguards
designed to deter police from harassing citizens fails to adequately protect videographers who
are unlawfully intimidated by police. Specifically, this Part will cover the failure of three
safeguards:

first, the external check provided by the public at large; second, self-policing

mechanisms such as internal affairs within police departments; and third, the civil remedy
available to a citizen who believes a public official has violated his constitutional rights. This
Part will demonstrate how each of these deterrents is ineffective at curbing potential police
misconduct toward videographers.
A. Safeguard #1: Public Oversight and How Police Can Defeat Its Purpose By Eliminating
Public Recording of Their Conduct
Some scholars argue that allowing citizens to freely videotape police in public
incentivizes police officers to properly fulfill their duties.122 Leaders at some police departments
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have adopted this view as well.123 Lieutenant Robin Larson, of the Broward County, Florida,
Sheriff’s Office, for instance, takes the position that “all our people should be conducting
themselves like they are being recorded all the time.”124

With the persistent threat of

surveillance, rational police officers would want to avoid committing any misconduct in public
because video documentation of that misconduct could be widely disseminated very rapidly.125
In that event, the general public, aware of the misconduct, could utilize the political process to
pressure law enforcement officers to respect the limits of their authority.126 Thus, mindful of
potential public scrutiny and scorn, police officers would generally avoid performing illegal
activities to protect themselves.127
The existence of some press coverage and public scrutiny of police misconduct indicates
that this deterrent is somewhat effective, but the evidence of police-videographer confrontations
in the news and on the internet suggests that police are undermining the effectiveness of video by
attempting to eliminate it.128 By intimidating and arresting videographers, police are creating
more footage of police-videographer confrontations, but may also be preventing footage of more
alarming misconduct, such as the beatings of Jack McKenna or Rodney King, from being
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created.129

An example is the case of Emily Good, a Rochester woman whose video-

confrontation with police garnered national attention.130 Rochester police officers arrested Good
for obstructing governmental administration when she filmed a traffic stop directly outside her
home.131 Good was somewhat of a social activist and she filmed the traffic stop because she
believed it involved racial profiling.132 Police commanded Good to stop recording the incident,
but when she continued one of the officers arrested her.133

Although a highly publicized

discussion about Good’s rights sprouted from the incident, police successfully frustrated Good’s
original purpose for filming.134 Good’s objective was to monitor police conduct in regard to
racial profiling, a rather serious issue, but the Rochester police officers succeeded in preventing
her from documenting anything related to that issue.135
The Good case highlights why the public-oversight deterrent fails to protect
videographers from harassment and intimidation.136 Instead of incentivizing officers to conduct
their police business properly, the presence of a video camera may actually encourage a police
officer to prevent the creation of footage of his conduct.137 To do so, the police officer may
harass, intimidate, and arrest the videographer and ultimately shield himself from liability for
potentially serious acts of misconduct.138 While some videographers may be defiant and willing
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to resist police pressures, many individuals may simply seek to avoid confrontation and instead
move on with their lives.139 The ultimate result is a chilling effect of filming police in public.
Granted, if the footage of the police officer attacking the videographer is as offensive as
the Rodney King beating, the public would probably demand accountability in a similar
manner.140 Still, this deterrent may only be effective when videographers are successful in
capturing police misconduct that warrants unified public outcry.

Police harassment of

videographers certainly warrants public scrutiny, but because the act of intimidating a
videographer is not nearly as offensive as police beatings, shootings, or corruption scandals, it is
not as likely to stir an equally strong public reaction.141 Ideally, the issues surrounding police
confrontations with videographers ought to be resolved before an incident similar to Rodney
King’s reoccurs.
Overall, another solution is needed because public awareness is not enough to prevent
police officers from intimidating and arresting videographers.

By aggressively engaging

videographers, police effectively chill videographers from monitoring police conduct which
simultaneously shields other types of misconduct from exposure.142 Since the public is not as
offended as it would be if other types of misconduct were captured on camera, it is not as
motivated to remedy the situation.
B. Safeguard #2: Internal Affairs: Why Law Enforcement Self-Policing Is Insufficient
Law enforcement leadership is in a position to self-correct police misconduct through
internal investigations and disciplining police officers.143 In the past, police leadership has
139

Cohen, supra note 129 (“Most people are not so game for a fight with the police. They just stop filming. These
are the cases no one finds out about, in which there is no arrest or prosecution, but the public’s freedoms have
nevertheless been eroded.”).
140
See id.
141
See id.
142
See Levato, supra note 130; see also discussion supra pp. 21–23.
143
See Cohen, supra note 129.

23

sternly held violating officers accountable for their actions.144 Also, some police departments
claim that the increase in public video-recording of police conduct has positively affected change
in department training and staffing.145 Broadly speaking, internal affairs has sometimes been
effective in combating forms of police misconduct.146
While police departments should be able to self-regulate, this established deterrent has
demonstrated several limitations. Especially in the context of police officers harassing and
intimidating videographers, it is unlikely that any substantial consequences will result when a
videographer complains to the police department.147

For instance, in Emily Good’s case,

Rochester Chief of Police James M. Sheppard conducted an investigation that resulted in no
announced disciplinary action but merely additional training and awareness for officers on the
force.148 Because the internal investigations are not transparent, the public has no way of
actually knowing if they are effective in correcting the problem.149
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Another problem with the internal-affairs model for reporting police misconduct is that in
the context of video records, citizens may be afraid to report.150 In Massachusetts, Michael Hyde
was arrested for violating wiretapping statutes while trying to report police abuse.151 Six days
after Hyde recorded an incident with police, he went to file a formal complaint at the Abington
police station.152 After the Abington police department performed an internal investigation,
which absolved five of its officers, it also sought a criminal complaint against Hyde for the
recording he used to complain about the officers.153 Since Hyde’s conviction was upheld,
videographers can be fearful, especially in states like Massachusetts with two-party-consent
wiretapping laws,154 that reporting incidents to the local police station could result in their own
arrest.
Another example is the case of Anthony Graber in Maryland. 155 Maryland State Police
raided Graber’s home and seized his camera and computer equipment after he posted a video of
himself being pulled-over by a police officer on YouTube.156 Graber was facing more than
fifteen years in prison if he was convicted of violating Maryland’s anti-wiretapping statute.157
Fortunately for Graber, Circuit Judge Emory Pitt threw out the four-count indictment against
Graber.158 Although Graber was ultimately vindicated, the prospect of spending over fifteen
years in prison for what may have been protected First Amendment activity is quite horrifying.159
If a different Judge presided over his case, it is very possible that Graber would be sitting in
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prison until approximately the year 2026.160

Although Graber was not reporting police

misconduct to the police, the effort by police to arrest Graber long after the traffic stop indicates
that if Graber had tried to report police conduct the way that Hyde did, he may have been
arrested in the same manner.161 Any videographer with footage of police misconduct might be
hesitant to bring such footage to the police’s attention if it may jeopardize his freedom.
Overall, law enforcement self-policing is unreliable in safeguarding against police
aggression toward videographers. Police officers are typically not punished harshly for violating
the rights of videographers and the reporting mechanism for concerned citizens poses too great
of a risk of arrest.162 If a citizen wishes to complain to police about an officer’s conduct, he may
hesitate to bring his video evidence of the alleged misconduct. So with no reason to take internal
investigations seriously and too much risk for citizens to bring video evidence of misconduct to
the police’s attention, it is unlikely that internal affairs can properly deter police officers from
violating videographers rights to film police in public.
C. Safeguard #3: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Remedies and Their Shortcomings
As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,163 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide
civil remedies for citizens whose rights have been abused “under the color” of state law. 164 The
statute allows a private citizen to sue for damages and prospective relief against municipalities
and local governments165 when officials violate their civil rights.166 Section 1983 is not itself a
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source of substantive rights; rather, it is merely a remedy or method for citizens to vindicate their
rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.167 In defining the remedy, the Supreme Court has noted
that § 1983 is intended to financially compensate victims of official misconduct.168
When a lawsuit is filed against a police officer in his official capacity, the suit is known
as an “official-capacity suit” and is treated as a suit against the government itself.169 To prevail
in a § 1983 official-capacity suit, a plaintiff must show that “the entity’s policy or custom played
a part in the violation of federal law.”170 Thus, for the government to be liable, the Supreme
Court requires the agent to directly harm the plaintiff on behalf of the government after it
implemented a policy, statement, regulation, or custom to be the “moving force” behind the
agent’s action.171 Besides a direct policy endorsing unlawful conduct, a failure to properly train
agents and employees can be a “moving force” behind the agent’s wrongful conduct. 172 The
failure to train must amount to “deliberate indifference,” however, meaning that the government
entity made a deliberate choice to not train police officers with respect to the violated right in
question.173 But, § 1983 plaintiffs will not succeed in showing “deliberate indifference” where a
police officer’s conduct is “obvious to all without training or supervision.”174
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Doubts exist as to whether § 1983 is an effective remedy.175 Absent a discoverable
pattern of violations, in order to claim that the government was “deliberately indifferent,” the
plaintiff would have to show that the failure to train officers made violations of federal rights
“highly predictable.”176 This requirement is farcical because the existence of a pattern does not
change that an individual’s rights have been violated in one specific instance. A pattern, by
definition, requires multiple occurrences of linkable events, but the plaintiff in any given § 1983
suit should not need to worry about anyone else’s violated rights. Whether others have had their
rights similarly violated is irrelevant in regard to compensating an individual for his injuries.
Attempting to prove that a failure to train made commission of violations “highly predictable” is
dubious as well.177 To determine if a violation is “highly predictable,” the court will determine if
the propensity to arrest videographers is a “plainly obvious consequence” of the government
entity’s decision-making procedures.178

This attenuated process ultimately circles back to

searching for a pattern of violations in the past, which, as discussed, seems unimportant in
relation to the fact that the plaintiff’s rights were violated.179
As it is difficult to find the municipality liable for a violation, additionally, the
individually-offending officers may be shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified
immunity.180

The qualified-immunity doctrine is intended to shield public officials from
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harassment, distraction, and liability when they are legitimately performing their duties.181
Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability when their actions arise
out of discretionary functions.182 To circumvent a police officer’s qualified-immunity defense,
the plaintiff must show or allege a violation of a “clearly established” constitutional right at the
time of the police officer’s alleged violation.183

Determining if a constitutional right was

“clearly established” requires two inquiries: whether the law was clear at the time of the alleged
civil rights violation; and, whether a reasonable police officer would have understood that his
conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.184
In examining the “clearly established” requirement, the clarity of the law at the time of
the alleged violation must be narrowly determined with respect to the specific facts of the
case.185 In addressing how specific the law must be in order to deny an officer qualified
immunity, a broad and generalized conceptualization of the law is not sufficient. 186 However,
this standard does not require that a prior court decision be on point.187 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Hope v. Pelzer established that firm precedent is not necessary for a plaintiff to
recover against an official.188 The reasonableness of a police officer depends on “whether the
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state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave the [officer] fair warning that his
particular conduct was unconstitutional.”189
Despite the plaintiff-friendly standard developed in Hope, the absence of cases on point is
still a basis for dismissal on qualified immunity.190 In dismissing for qualified immunity, the
Supreme Court, in Brosseau, stressed the lack of similar cases where a police officer shot and
wounded the plaintiff, who alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.191 The
Court’s dissonance with its own decision in Hope has created confusion in lower courts and
clouded the “clearly established” standard for qualified immunity. 192 Often, police officers will
have qualified immunity, which creates a heavy burden for a videographer seeking damages
from an individual police officer.193 In practice, “[t]he qualified immunity standard gives ample
room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”194 Essentially, if the law is confusing, police officers may be able to
invoke qualified immunity.195
In regard to incidents involving recording police, some courts have allowed arresting
officers to invoke qualified immunity after wrongful conduct.196 An example is Kelly v. Borough
of Carlisle, where a police officer arrested a passenger and seized his camera for filming him
during a traffic stop.197

Maintaining the officer’s qualified immunity, the Third Circuit

recognized a broad right to videotape police, but not a “clearly established” right due to the
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confusing state of the law.198 Because the case law was murky, a reasonably competent officer
could not be put on “fair notice” that seizing a camera and arresting the videographer would
violate the First Amendment.199

Additionally, after the police officer initially seized the

passenger’s camera, he called the assistant district attorney to inquire whether the passenger
actually violated Pennsylvania’s anti-wiretap statute.200

Unfortunately, the assistant district

attorney misunderstood the law and recommended that the police officer arrest the passenger.201
Although this fact vindicates the officer’s reasonableness in making the final arrest, the officer
still seized the camera before contacting the local prosecutor.202 If the police officer inquired
before confiscating the videographer’s camera, it would be difficult to argue that his conduct was
unreasonable.203 That was not the case but, nevertheless, the police officer was vindicated.204
In circumstances where a § 1983 litigant is successful, the statute permits courts to
fashion a range of both legal and equitable remedies, but severely limits injunctive relief. 205
Specifically, federal courts are not in a position to enjoin municipal police departments.206
Without injunctive relief, successful plaintiffs could seek compensatory damages for injuries, but
in order for the court to award damages, the plaintiff must suffer actual harm.207 Additionally,
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the Supreme Court has permitted plaintiffs to recover punitive damages from individual police
officers, but not from municipalities.208 However, punitive damages are only available from an
individual officer where his “conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when
it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federal protected rights of others.”209
For videographers, whose right to film has been violated, § 1983 remedies are not very
helpful. First, losing the ability to film does not constitute what is typically considered an
“actual injury” deserving of compensation.210 In Carey v. Piphus, despite finding that the
plaintiffs were denied due process when they were wrongly suspended from school, the Supreme
Court rejected anything but nominal damages because the plaintiffs lacked evidence of actual
injury.211

Subsequently, the Court interpreted Carey as denying any concept of presumed

damages.212 In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, the Supreme Court solidified
the Carey principle when it concluded that damages under § 1983 exist only to compensate
plaintiffs who are actually injured, noting that “damages based on the ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of
constitutional rights are not authorized . . . because they are not truly compensatory.” 213 Punitive
rights are similarly unattainable because of the ambiguous “evil motive or intent” standard
required, the limitation against application to municipalities, and the likelihood that qualified
immunity will be shield an offending officer.214 Therefore, because First Amendment rights such
as free speech and news-gathering cannot be monetized, § 1983 fails to adequately protect
aggrieved videographers.215
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Overall, although § 1983 initially looks like a decent remedy, it is too narrow for
videographers because the burden for establishing a municipality’s liability is too heavy,
qualified immunity shields offending officers, and courts do not provide adequate damages when
officers violate constitutional rights. Since the likelihood of a plaintiff receiving compensation
for his injury is rather diminished, it follows that the rules of § 1983 seem to favor protecting
police officers who did not know or care that a right existed over preservation of the right itself.
Absent a prescribed remedy for violations, § 1983 fails to safeguard against unreasonable law
enforcement intrusions.216 Although § 1983 was put in place to address citizens’ grievances for
violations of their constitutional rights, in the context of citizens filming police it fails to remedy
anything, which results in no deterrence for police officers and no protection for videographers.
V. Bright-Line Rule: Explicitly Stated Remedies and Personal Liability
The purpose of this Part is to provide a model legislative framework for protecting
videographers against police harassment. First, this Part will discuss the rationale behind the
model and how the legislation should meet the shortcomings of § 1983 civil rights actions.
Then, this Part will present the model legislation itself, which state governments could consider,
amend, and enact to protect videographers from police intimidation.
A. Considerations in Constructing a Videographer Protection Law
Police should be deterred from intimidating and harassing videographers who film their
conduct in public.217 To effectively deter police officers, the choice of whether or not to violate
an individual’s rights must be eliminated from a reasonable police officer’s mind. Rationally, in
making every decision a police officer would most likely balance interests of privacy, safety, and
216
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self-preservation in deciding whether or not to act in a certain situation. If the balancing of these
values is altered by making a police officer, in the interest of self-preservation, not want to
violate a videographer’s First Amendment rights, then the deterrent is effective.
The framers of the Constitution recognized that police power could potentially be abused
and in turn harm free society.218 Communities entrust police officers with powers that are
sometimes abused.219 Permitting individuals to record interactions with police without fear of
prosecution is essential to balance the government’s need to enforce laws and a citizen’s right to
be free from government abuse.220
accountable for their actions.221

When abuses occur, police officers ought to be fully

Protecting certain police interests, such as privacy when

performing official public functions, is “inconsistent with democracy and democratic political
accountability” when it results in a violation of a private citizen’s guaranteed First Amendment
rights.222 Police should not be insulated from consequences when their conduct is unlawful.223
Instead, police officers’ discretionary power should be reduced so that they have less of an
opportunity to harm citizens’ First Amendment rights without a challenge.224
In the narrow context of protecting citizens who are filming police officers in the public
discharge of their duties, an effective means of deterring police misconduct is to have a strict law
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that punishes police officers who harass, intimidate, oppress, or arrest an individual because the
individual is video-recording their conduct. Legislatures, in constructing such a law, should
weigh many interests, such as police safety, potential unlawful conduct on behalf of the
videographer apart from the act of filming, and the overall context of the incident. But to be
effective, the primary objective of the law must be to protect a videographer’s rights to be free
from police abuse.
A categorical prohibition on police conduct would be problematic because circumstances
exist where police action against a videographer is appropriate.225 But such circumstances must
be narrowly construed. A broad exception based on soft standards like “reasonableness” could
render the entire law useless. To help prevent this from happening, legislatures must define
possible exceptions to the rule as affirmative defenses. These exceptions could include that the
videographer was simultaneously breaking some other criminal statute besides the filming or that
the police officer or videographer would be in direct, impending danger without the officer’s
intervention. Under this model, defendant police officers carry the burden of proving that their
conduct did in fact fall within the grounds of the exception for what otherwise may have been an
unlawful violation of a citizen’s First Amendment rights.
Since First Amendment rights are unclear from things such as time, place, and manner
restrictions, and murky wiretapping statutes, a presumption should exist that protects openly
filming the police officer’s public conduct.226 This presumption would provide the law with a
“tie-goes-to-the-runner” judgment mechanism which leans toward protecting videographers.227
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“Tie goes to the runner” would mean that where the First Amendment right’s existence is subject
to close dispute, the conduct should go undisturbed by police. Of course, other conduct apart
from the act of filming may open a videographer to interference from police. However, possible
exceptions which allow a police officer to interfere with a videographer’s filming of his conduct
should revolve around actual, not theoretical, threats to the safety of the videographer, the police
officer, and other citizens and enforcement of other citizens’ privacy rights.
Additionally, for the law to be effective as a deterrent, the remedy must be appropriate.
The goal of the remedy must be, in part, to offer some compensation to the aggrieved
videographer, but moreso to punish the violating police officer who may have offended the
videographer’s First Amendment rights. Unless the harm done to the videographer can actually
be categorized under other forms of misconduct such as brutality, the mere intimidation and
arrest of the videographer should result in direct damages against the violating police officers
and a short suspension from field duty. This degree of punitive treatment would raise a greater
deterrent effect than internal investigations, which at times merely led to additional training
without any actual discipline.228
Besides adequate deterrence, the state law should also seek to fill in the holes left by §
1983 and the federal courts. Since § 1983 fails to provide adequate damages for those who
suffer no injury besides a violated constitutional right, legislatures should incorporate liquidated
or presumed damages into the statute.229 In terms of avoiding problems that qualified immunity
causes, automatic liability eliminates the shield and simultaneously bypasses the entire debate
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about “clearly established” laws.230 If a state passes the model legislation below, the state
essentially removes the narrow issue of filming police officers from the complicated and cloudy
realm of federalism and constitutional law. Lastly, considering how state legislatures may be
cautious to micro-manage executive-operated agencies, liability for the municipalities is not part
of the legislation. The rationale for this omission is centered around law enforcement’s inability
to effectively self-police231 and to attack individual police officers’ temptations to violate
videographers’ rights.232
B. Model “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act”
Below is the “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act” or the “V.I.P. Act.”

The

following is a hypothetical construction of legislation that could effectively deter police from
violating videographers’ First Amendment right to openly film police conduct in public:
Section 1: [Violation] No law enforcement officer, in the scope of his or her official
duties, shall:
(a) abridge the right of an individual to video-record (including audio) his or her
conduct, or the conduct of other police officers in a public place;
(b) harass, intimidate, abuse, question, or arrest any private citizen for the
purposes of stopping, inhibiting, or preventing an individual from recording any
law-enforcement officer’s conduct in a public place; or
(c) demand or require an individual to turn off his or her camera or otherwise stop
filming for the purpose of stopping, inhibiting, or preventing an individual from
recording any law enforcement officer’s conduct in a public place;
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Section 2: [Defenses] A law enforcement officer may present any of the following
affirmative defenses:
(a) Actual, not theoretical, threat of impending harm to the police officer that is
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming;
(b) Actual, not theoretical, threat of impending harm to the videographer that is
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming;
(c) Actual, not theoretical, threat of impending harm to a nearby third party that is
materially related to the videographer’s act of filming;
(d) Valid reason exists to confront the videographer outside of his act of filming,
including but not limited to violations of a criminal statute not related to
recording a law-enforcement officer’s conduct; or
(e) Enforcing the privacy rights of private citizens, or a criminal anti-wiretapping
statute as it pertains to private citizens, but not of any public official acting in
his or her official capacity.
Section 3: [Evidence] In the event that the law-enforcement officer destroys the recording
and cannot successfully assert an affirmative defense, liability is automatically applied.
Section 4: [Penalty] Where a law-enforcement officer is found to have violated this
statute, the law-enforcement officer is to be:
(a) held personally liable for no less than $1,000 but no more than $2,500;233 and
(b) suspended from public duty for at least three days but no more than twentyone days.
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These figures were determined based on median pay for patrol officers in the United States. With the median
salary at approximately $50,000 per year, a discretionary penalty between two and five percent of annual pay is
appropriate for deterrence purposes but not devastating to the officer’s well-being. See Police Patrol Officer—U.S.
National Averages, SALARY.COM (last visited Feb. 14, 2012), http://www1.salary.com/police-officer-Salary.html.

38

VI. Conclusion
A First Amendment right to film police officers in public exists and ought to be
universally supported.234

From case law and scholarly legal commentary, it is more than

reasonable to conclude that the right exists and, subject to some narrow limitations, should not be
abridged.235 However, individuals’ First Amendment rights are sometimes violated.236 This
occurs because police officers have interests in resisting the legal community’s statement that
private citizens have a right to film police officers in public.237
Police frequently escape liability when they abuse their power because the legal
landscape is proving to be an enabling environment.238 That environment, combined with the
growing widespread availability of video-recording devices, has police resorting to abuse of their
power to chill videographer’s actions.239 The current framework of deterrents fails to address
this chilling effect adequately.240 Since the deterrents are too weak, or too avoidable, officers
can often abuse their power without punishment.241
To resolve this problem, legislatures should pass a stricter law which directly targets and
prevents police officers from interfering with videographers filming their conduct. 242 Had a
safeguard effectively been enacted, perhaps citizens like Emily Good would not have been
falsely arrested for openly and unobtrusively monitoring police in the public discharge of their
duties.243
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